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Optimal Exploration and Production of a Nonrenewable Resource
ABSTRACT
Earlier studies of exhaustible resource production and pricing usually
assume that there is a fixed reserve base that can be exploited over time. In
reality there is no "fixed" reserve base (in an economically meaningful sense),
since as price rises, additional proved and potential reserves become economical.
Here we view a resource like oil as being "nonrenewable" rather than "exhaustible."
There is a proved reserve base which is the basis for production, and exploratory
activity is the means of increasing or maintaining this proved reserve base.
"Potential reserves" are unlimited, but as depletion ensues, given amounts of ex-
ploratory activity result in ever-smaller discoveries. Thus resource producers
must determine simultaneously their optimal rate of exploratory activity and their
optimal rate of production. Optimal trajectories for exploratory activity and
production are determined for both competitive and monopolistic producers, and are
applied to a simple model of oil production in the Permian region of Texas.
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Optimal Exploration and Production of a Nonrenewable Resource
1. Introduction
The optimal pricing and production of an exhaustible resource in different
market settings has by now been fairly well analyzed. Hotelling [10] first demon-
strated that with constant marginal extraction costs, price minus marginal cost
should rise at the rate of discount in a competitive market, and rents (marginal
revenue minus marginal cost) should rise at the rate of discount in a monopolistic
market.1 The monopoly price will initially be higher (and later will be lower) than
the competitive price, but the extent to which the two prices will differ depends
on the level of production cost and the particular way in which demand elasticities
2
change as the resource is depleted. If extraction costs rise as the resource is
depleted, both the monopolist and competitor will be more "conservationist," i.e.
they will set prices that are initially higher but that grow less rapidly relative
3
to the case of constant extraction cost.
More recent work has extended the basic Hotelling model in a number of direc-
4
tions. There has been particular concern about the effects of uncertainty (over the
resource reserve base, the appearance of substitutes for the resource, and changes
in demand) on the rate of extraction. As one would expect, a resource should be
extracted more slowly (by a monopolist or a competitor) when the reserve base is
not known with certainty. The characteristics of extraction paths under reserve
uncertainty have been examined by Gilbert [4] and Loury [12]. Dasgupta and Stiglitz
[2] and Hoel [9] studied optimal extraction paths when a substitute for the resource
1For other derivations and interpretations of Hotelling's results, see Herfindahl [8]
and Gordon [6]. For further discussion see Solow [15].
2
This is examined by Stiglitz [17] and Sweeney [18]. Stiglitz shows that if extrac-
tion costs are zero and the demand elasticity is constant, the monopoly and com-
petitive price trajectories will be the same.
3The case of rising extraction costs has been examined by Heal [7], Levhari and
Leviatan [11], and Solow and Wan [16]. Price trajectories for several empirical
examples have been calculated by Pindyck [14].
4For a general development and presentation of most of the the recent results in the
economics of exhaustible resources, see Dasgupta and Heal [1]. For a survey,
see Peterson and Fisher [13].
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may be introduced at some uncertain future time, under alternative market structures
for both the resource and the substitute. Gilbert [4,5] examined the use and
value of exploratory activity to obtain a better estimate of the size of the re-
serve base.
In this paper we also examine exploratory activity. Here, however, the result
of exploration is not better information about the reserve base (proved reserves
are assumed known with certainty, and "potential reserves" are assumed unlimited),
but rather additions to the reserve base. This allows us to deal with the problem
that in reality there is no "fixed" reserve base (in an economically meaningful
sense) for any resource. If the price of oil were to rise to $200 per barrel
(and the demand for oil did not drop to zero), oil would probably be found in some
rather strange places. It makes more sense to think of a resource like oil as being
"nonrenewable," rather than "exhaustible."
In our model exploratory activity is the means of accumulating or maintaining
a level of reserves, and we treat depletion by assuming that reserve additions
("discoveries") resulting from exploratory activity fall as cumulative discoveries
increase. The desired level of reserves depends in part on the behavior of pro-
duction costs. If production costs were independent of reserves (and if there were
no uncertainty about the discoveries resulting from exploratory activity), producers
would postpone much of their exploratory activity (thereby discounting its cost) and
maintain no reserves. In fact, production costs rise as reserves decline (although
the exact relationship between the two may be complex).5 Thus producers must simul-
5For resources like oil and gas, at the level of individual pools and fields lover
reserves means higher extraction costs as the rate of physical output per unit of
capital equipment declines, and eventually as secondary and tertiary recovery
techniques are needed. Even at the aggregate level, however, reserve depletion
will be accompanied by higher average extraction costs since lower cost deposits
are usually produced first, and of those individual deposits with similar cost charac-
teristics, reserves per deposit will on average be lower when aggregate reserves
are lower. For many mineral resources extraction costs will similarly increase as
higher cost deposits are tapped and as deeper mines must be utilized for individual
deposits.
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taneously determine optimal levels of exploratory activity and production - resulting
in an optimal reserve level - that balance revenues with exploration costs, production
costs, and the "user cost" of depletion.
The design of an optimal exploration strategy to accumulate reserves has already
been examined by Uhler [19], who calculated an optimal rate of exploratory effort
assuming a fixed price for the resource. The price (and rate of production) of the
resource, however, will change over time, and the optimal production rate and ex-
ploration rate are interrelated. Here we examine exploration and production simul-
taneously, and study the joint dynamics of the two.
2. Exploration and Production under Competition and Monopoly
6
We consider first competitive producers of a nonrenewable resource. Pro-
ducers take the price p as given, and choose a rate of production q from a proved
reserve base R. The average cost of production C1(R) increases as the proved re-
serve base in depleted. Additions to the proved reserve base occur in response to the
level of exploratory effort w. The rate of flow of additions to proved reserves de-
pends on both w and cumulative reserve additions x, i.e. x = f(w,x), with f > 0 and
w
fx < 0. Thus as exploration and discovery proceed over time, it becomes more and
more difficult to make new discoveries. The cost of exploratory effort C2(w) in-
creases with w. We assume that C"(w) ~ 0, and that the marginal discovery cost,
C'(w)/fw, increases as w increases.8 The producer's problem, then, is as follows:C2
Max W = f [qp - C(R)q C2(w)]e-dt (1)
q,w o
subject to R = x - q (2)
= f(w,x) (3)
and R 0, q O, w O, x > O (4)
6We are ignoring the problem of common access. In effect we are assuming here that
there are a large number of identical firms that all ignore each other, or, equiva-
lently but more realistically, that a state-owned company has sole exploration and
production rights, and sets a competitive price.
w might represent the number of exploratory wells drilled, or it might be an index
of drilling footage adjusted for depth.
Note that CM(w) and fw are, respectively, the additional cost and the additional
discoveries associated with one more unit of exploratory effort.
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The solution of this optimization problem is straightforward. The Hamiltonian
is
H = qpe - Cl(R)qe - C2 (w)e dt + Xl(f(w,x)-q) + X2 f(w,x) (5)
Note that H is a linear function of q but in general a nonlinear function of w.
Differentiating H with respect to R and x gives the dynamic equations for X1 and
X2:
1 = C(R)qe 6t (6)
2 =- (X1 + 2) f (7)
From (5) we see that each producer should produce either nothing or at some maxi-
mum capacity level, depending on whether pe t C1(R)e - A1 is negative or posi-
tive. Since this expression depends on the price p, market clearing will ensure
that
-6t -6t
pe - Cl (R)e - 1X = (8)
Note that X1 is the marginal profit-to-go resulting from an additional unit of re-
serves. X1 is always positive, but X1 is negative, since C(R) is negative by
assumption, so that X1 approaches zero as depletion ensues. We can see immediately
then that at some point production will cease (generally before proved reserves
become zero), even though further exploration could yield more reserves.
Differentiating (8) with respect to time, substituting (2) for R, and equating
with (6) gives us the equation describing the dynamics of the price path:
p = 6p - 6C1(R) + C(R)f(w,x) (9)1~~~~~~~~~~~~9
Observe that price rises more slowly than in the case of production without explora-
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9
tion. Note also that if C(R) is zero, i.e. if production costs do not depend on
reserves, the rate of change in the price path is unaffected by exploration and is
identical with that in the standard constant-cost Hotelling problem. The level of
the price path, however, will be affected by exploration; since "planned" reserves
(i.e. the total amount of the resource available for production, including what will
ultimately be discovered) are greater than initial reserves, our producer can set the
initial price at a lower level. Price trajectories with and without exploration
are shown for zero extraction costs in Figure 1.
P
t
T
Figure I: Price Paths for Zero Extraction Costs
9We showed in an earlier paper [14] that if extraction costs rise as reserves fall,
but there is no exploration, price follows the equation p = p - C (R). Note
however, that the introduction of exploration does not make our proaucer more con-
servationist. Given any initial reserve level R , total production will be larger
if there were no exploration, so that price can Begin at a lower level and rise more
slowly over a longer period of time.
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We can now determine the optimal rate of exploration by setting aH/aw equal to 0,
and substituting in equation (8) for A1. This yields the following equation for A2:
2  -6t -6t CL(R)e-6 (10)
2 f e - pe(R)e
w
Using equations (8) and (10), we can rewrite equation (7) as:
f
2 f C2
w
Differentiating equation (10) with respect to time and substituting (2), (3), and
(9) for R, x, and p yields:
f f Cf (w) - C (w)f
C'w) e + we
2 2 2(f 2 (fw)2
C(w) 
-6t 
-6t
- f e -t C'(R)qe -6t (12)
W '
w
Equating this with (11) and rearranging gives us an equation that describes
the dynamics of exploratory effort:
f
C'(w)[. f - f + 6] + C'(R)qf
· C2 x Cl wW
f
C'(w) - C( ww. (13)
w
Since the Hamiltonian evaluated at the terminal time T (when production
ceases) must be zero, we know that at the terminal time exploratory effort must
be zero, and this provides a boundary condition for w. A second boundary con-
dition can be obtained from the transversality condition. Since there is no
terminal cost associated with cumulative discoveries x, we know that 2 (T) = 0.
Then from equation (10) and the fact that wT = 0, we have that PT C(RT),
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i.e. price rises and reserves fall (raising extraction costs) until the profit
resulting from the extraction of the last bit of the resource is just zero.
Given particular functional forms for f, C1 and C2, and a demand function relat-
ing p and q, equations (9) and (13) can be solved together with the boundary
conditions described above to yield paths for price (and hence production) and
exploratory effort.
The particular pattern of exploratory effort, price, and production depends
critically on the initial value of reserves. The intertermporal trade-off in
exploration involves balancing the gain from postponing exploration (so that its
cost can be discounted) with the loss from higher current production costs
resulting from a lower reserve base. If initial reserves are large so that C1 (R)
is small, most exploration can be postponed to the future, whereas if initial
reserves are small, exploration must occur early on so as to increase the inventory
of proved reserves. In this latter case production will increase initially (as
price falls), and later reserves and production will fall as exploratory effort
diminishes. We will examine the behavior of price and exploratory effort in more
detail in Section 4 of the paper.
Let us now turn to the case of a monopolistic producer. The monopolist
also chooses q and w to maximize the sum of discounted profits in equation
(1), but faces a demand function p(q), with p'(q) < 0. Equations (6) and (7)
still apply, but maximizing H with respect to q yields
X =MRt e- 6 t - C (R)e (14)
with MR = p + q(dp/dq). Differentiating (14) with respect to time and equating
with (6) gives us the equation describing the dynamics of marginal revenue:
MR = MR - SC1 (R) + C(R)f(w,x) (15)
-8-
Again note that if extraction costs do not depend on the reserve level, marginal
revenue follows the same differential equation as in the standard Hotelling prob-
lem, i.e. marginal revenue net of extraction cost rises at the rate of discount.
Given any initial reserve level, however, exploration permits the initial price
(and marginal revenue) to be lower since the total quantity that can be extracted
will be greater.
Maximizing H with respect to w and substituting (14) for Xl gives us an ex-
pression for X2:
C2(WR -6t -6t -6t (16)
X2 = f e - MRte + C(R)e
w
Differentiating this with respect to time, and equating with (7) yields the differ-
ential equation for w:
f
C2(w)[ ' f - fx + 6] + C'(R)qf
w (17)
f
C'(w) - C(w)fww
w
This is identical to equation (13), but this does not mean that the pattern of ex-
ploratory effort is the same in the monopoly and competitive cases. Initially
q is lower for the monopolist, and since C'(R) is negative, w is larger. Whether
initial proved reserves are small or large, the monopolist will initially undertake
10less exploratory activity than the competitor, but later he will undertake more.
3. Measuring Resource Scarcity
In the United States, policy makers often use estimated "potential reserves"
of oil, natural gas, and various minerals as a measure of resource scarcity. This,
1 0Unless extraction costs are zero and the elasticity of demand is constant, in
which case both price and exploratory activity will be the same for the monopolist
and the competitor. Stiglitz demonstrated [17], for the case of production without
exploration, that these special conditions result in monopolistic and competitive
price trajectories that are identical. When extraction costs are zero the differ-
ential equations for price (in the competitive case) and for marginal revenue (in
the monopoly case) do not depend on reserves or exploratory activity, so that
price (and quantity) trajectories are again identical. Since equations (13) and
(17) are identical, the trajectories for exploratory effort will also be the
same.
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of course, implies viewing these resources as exhaustible, which as we have argued
makes little economic sense. But even if such resources were exhaustible, the volume
of potential reserves does not provide a useful measure of scarcity, since it does
not reflect the difficulty of actually obtaining these reserves. As Fisher points
out [3], an appropriate scarcity measure "should summarize the sacrifices required
to obtain a unit of the resource," and if by a resource we mean the raw material in
the ground, the "rent" or "user cost" component of price (i.e. the components of
price other than extraction cost) is a better measure of scarcity. Extraction costs
may rise or fall independently of.how much of the resource is left in the ground,
but rent (i.e. the difference between price and marginal extraction cost in a com-
petitive market) represents the opportunity cost of resource extraction, which
better reflects resource scarcity.
In this paper we have argued that most mineral resources can be best thought
of as nonrenewable but inexhaustible, so that "potential reserves" has little
meaning as a scarcity measure. On the other hand, "rent" provides a scarcity
measure that is particularly appropriate. To see this, rearrange equation (8) for
price in the competitive case:
p = Cl(R) + e (18)
The second term on the right-hand side of this equation is undiscounted rent,
and by setting H/aw equal to 0, we see that it has two components:
C'(w)
Xle = - X 2e (19)
w
The second term on the right-hand side of (19) is the shadow price of an additional
unit of cumulative discoveries, and measures the impact of this additional unit on
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future marginal discovery costs. We would usually expect to be negative, since
2
discoveries today result in an increase in the amount of exploratory effort that will
be needed to obtain future discoveries.ll
One might ask why both the marginal discovery cost and the opportunity cost
of additional cumulative discoveries should be included in a measure of scarcity,
rather than simply lumping discovery cost together with extraction cost and using
only the last term in (19) to measure scarcity. Note from equation (11) that
(assuming 2 is negative) A2 is positive, so that the discounted value of this op-
portunity cost becomes smaller in magnitude over time - as the actual value of
marginal discovery cost grows. The reason is that once marginal discovery cost
has become very large - and the resource is very scarce - resource use decreases
as potential future profits become small, so that the opportunity cost of additional
discoveries is small. For example, it might be that 30 years from now the marginal
discovery cost of oil will exceed $100 per barrel, at which time oil will be ex-
tremely scarce, even though the opportunity cost of additional discoveries will
be small. Thus the full rent of equation (19) should be used to measure scarcity.
4. The Behavior of Optimal Exploration and Production
In the solution of the typical exhaustible resource problem for a competitive
market, price rises slowly over time as reserves are depleted, so that demand is
choked off just as the last unit is extracted (if extraction costs are constant),
or just as the profit on the last unit extracted becomes zero (if extraction
costs rise as reserves decline). In our model of a nonrenewable resource, price
As Fisher [3] and Uhler [19,20] point out, additional cumulative discoveries might
initially result in a decrease in the amount of exploratory effort needed to obtain
future discoveries by providing geological information. In this case would
be positive initially, and would later become negative as the effects o depletibn
offset the informational gains from cumulative discoveries. Uranium is a resource
for which 2 might conceivably be positive today, but for most-other resources of
policy interest (and particularly oil and gas), A2 is negative.
12This is still an imperfect measure of scarcity in that it does not reflect external
costs (such as environmental damage resulting from resource exploration, discovery,
and production).
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will also rise (more slowly than before) and reserves will steadily decline, but
only if reserves are very large to begin with (so that extraction costs are low).
As we will see, if reserves are initially very low, price will start high, fall as
reserves increase (as a result of exploratory activity), and then rise slowly as
reserves decline.
If reserves are initially very large, C1(R) and C(R) will be small, so that
p will be positive - in fact the rate of growth of p will be just slightly below
the discount rate. If reserves are large, w will also be positive. To see this,
observe that the denominator of the right-hand side of (13) is always positive,
while the first term in the numerator is positive, and the second term is very
small.1 3 Thus w will begin growing from some very low level (when reserves are
large, new discoveries are not needed initially, so that the cost of exploration
can be postponed and thus discounted). Since initially there are almost no dis-
coveries, reserves will fall. Reserves will fall more and more slowly, however, as
exploration increases. At some point after reserves have become small enough,
w will become negative (as C(R) becomes large), and exploration will decline
towards zero as most of the reserves are used up. Price will increase until de-
mand is choked off just as profit on the last unit of the resource is zero, and
just as exploratory activity becomes zero. At this point the resource has not
been "exhausted," but it no longer pays to explore for new reserves. This
pattern of exploratory activity and reserves is shown in Figure 2.
Suppose extraction costs are small relative to price and to the costs of ex-
ploration. Then there is no value in holding a large stock of reserves, and most
exploratory activity will be postponed until near the end of the planning horizon.
This is illustrated by the dotted lines in Figure 2.
12 By assumption, d/dw[C2(w)/f w] > 0. Then, since fw > , [C C f/fw] > 0.
Since w is small initially, (fwx/fw)f - fx < 6, and since R is large, C(R) is
small.
-12-
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If reserves are initially very small, price will begin declining from a high
level (since C (R) and C(R) are large in magnitude). Exploration will also begin de-
clining from some high level (again because C(R) is a large negative number). Re-
serves will at first increase in response to exploration, but later will decrease as
exploration diminishes and the average product of exploration increases. As reserves
decrease price will increase, until demand becomes zero as exploratory activity becomes
zero and the profit on the last extracted unit of the resource becomes zero. This
is illustrated in Figure 3.
If extraction costs are small, exploration can decline more rapidly since there
is no need to build up as large a stock of reserves. Later as production increases,
w can become positive; exploration then increases so that the stock of reserves
does not fall to zero too quickly. Finally, as the returns from exploration di-
minish, C(R) will dominate the numerator of (13), w will become negative, and
exploration will fall to zero. This is illustrated by the dotted lines in Figure 3.
The behavior of exploration and production under different initial conditions
and different extraction costs can be summarized by the phase diagram in Figure 4.
From equations (2) and (3) we see that the R=O isokine will be nearly vertical
for large values of R, but as R becomes small, q will become small, so that this
isokine will bend in towards the origin. From equation (13) it is clear that the
w=O isokine will be downward sloping, since increased R and increased w both make
w larger. Note, however, that this isokine will shift to the left if q decreases,
or if cumulative discoveries x increases. Also, this isokine will be closer to
the origin if extraction costs are relatively low. In the figure, the isokine
[w-0]1 corresponds to large extraction costs. The isokines [w=0]2 and [w-0]3
correspond to relatively low extraction costs, with q small and/or x large for
[w=-O]2, and the opposite for [=-O]3.
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If reserves are initially large, the optimal trajectory is given by curve A in
Figure 4. Note that reserves always decrease, with exploration increasing and then
decreasing. If reserves are initially small, the optimal trajectory could be given
by curveBs [ or C, depending on extracltion costs. If extraction costs are Targe,
exploration will be at a higher level and will continually decrease, as in B. If
extraction costs are small, exploration can decrease, increase, and decrease again
as in C. Here the trajectory crosses the w=0 isokine -so that w becomes positive,
the isokine shifts to the right as q increases so that w becomes negative again,
R=O
1 3
2
Figure 4: Phase Diagram and Optimal Trajectories
I.
.
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and reserves keep falling as the isokine moves back to the left as a result of de-
creasing q and increasing x.
5. The Case of No Depletion
If the returns from exploration do not decline as cumulative discoveries in-
creases, i.e. if f = 0, production can go on indefinitely. In this case there
will be an initial transient period during which reserves approach some long-run
steady-state level R, and after which steady-state exploration w results in dis-
coveries ust equal to steady-state production q. This can be seen from the
phase diagram in Figure 5. Since f = 0, increases in cumulative discoveries
will not result in a shift of the w=-0 isokine. Trajectories A and B (large
initial reserves and small initial reserves, respectively) lead to a long-run
equilibrium of constant reserves and production. Any other trajectory leads to
reserves and a level of exploration that grow large without limit, or else to a
decline in reserves and cessation of production.
We can examine the characteristics of this steady-state by setting f and w
equal to 0 in equation (13). From this we obtain
C'(w) c(R)q2 1 (20)
f 6
w
The right-hand side of (20) is the present discounted value of the annual flow of
extraction cost savings resulting from one extra unit of reserves. If this quantity
is less than the marginal discovery cost incurred in maintaining that extra unit of
reserves (the left-hand side of (20)), profits would be greater with a level of
exploration below the steady-state level, and indeed, we will have w > 0, w < w, anc
R > R. Similarly, if this quantity is greater than the marginal discovery cost, we
will have w < 0, w > w, and R < R. In the first case the initial reserve level
is larger than necessary, and in the second case it is too small.
-16-
R = O
W
W
Figure 5: Phase Diagram for Case of No Depletion
We can also see that the optimum steady-state w, R, and q is independent of
initial reserves. Since R = 0 in the steady-state, q = f(w). The under competition
p is taken as given, and w is chosen to maximize profit:
max = pf(w) - C(R)f(w) - C2(W) (21)
w
Setting a0/aw = O gives us a relationship between w, R, and p:
w = g(R,p)
R
(22)
-17-
Since w = 0, we have from equation (3)
6C (w) + C'(R))f'(w)f O (23)2 + f1*
Finally, we have
f(w) = q (24)
and p = p(q) (25)
Thus equations (22), (23), (24) and (25) provide a unique solution for w, R, q,
and p that is independent of the initial conditions. This can be thought of as a
"Golden Rule" of reserve accumulation; whatever "endowed" initial reserves are,
they will be increased (or, if they are very large, allowed to decline) until a
profit-maximizing steady state level is reached.
6. A Numerical Example
It is useful to examine the characteristics of the competitive and monopoly
solutions for exploration and production in the context of a specific numerical
example. We have therefore specified functional forms for f(w,x), C1(R) and C2(w),
and fit these to data for oil exploration, discovery, and production in the Permian
region of Texas. We do not pretend that this example provides a realistic repre-
sentation of the real world; the functions themselves are over-simplified, and we
ignore important aspects of market structure. 4 On the other hand, by using these
functions to compute optimal competitive and monopoly solutions for exploration and
production (and comparing these solutions to actual data over the past decade), we
can examine the implications of our results in an empirical context.
14We are describing the highly complex process of exploration and discovery by a
simple deterministic function, the actual market may not be perfectly competitive,
we are ignoring problems of common access, and perhaps most important, we are ig-
noring the effects of government controls. We can only hope to have captured
enough of the real world to tell an interesting story!
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Although the characteristics of average production cost may be complex, our aim
here is only to capture the fact that this cost increases as reserves decrease. We
therefore assume for convenience that average extraction costs increase hyperbolically
as the proved reserve base goes to zero, i.e.1 5
C1(R) = m/R (26)
In 1966 extraction costs were $1.25 per barrel, and Permian reserves were 7170
million barrels, so we set m = 8960.
We represent the level of exploratory activity by the number of exploratory and
development wells drilled each year. Over the years, the cost per well has been lower
when the number of wells drilled has been higher, suggesting mild economies of scale.
We therefore choose the following cost function:
C2(w) alw + a2 (27)
Measuring C2 in millions of 1966 dollars, and w in number of wells, we obtain the
following estimated equation using data for 1966-1974 (t-statistics in parentheses):
C2(w) = 0.0670 + 103.2/w (28)
w (5.09) (2.43)
R = .458 S.E. = .0039 F(L/7) = 5.90
We assume that the discoveries function is of the form:
f(w,x) = Aw e , , > 0 (29)
O15ne might argue that aggregate average production cost will rise very slowly
over a broad range of reserve levels, and will increase sharply only when re-
serves become very small. This would suggest the function C (R) = m/R2. We
use equation (26) since it more closely represents the behavior of production
cost at the level of individual pools.
16
Uhler [19] finds that the following discovery function provides a fairly close
fit for oil and gas producing regions in Alberta:
f(w,x) = Awe (x-k) -Bx
Equation (29) is more tractable, and provides a reasonably close approximation
to this function if exploration has gone on for some time, i.e. if x is not small.
-19-
Actual crude oil reserve additions consist of three components - new discoveries,
extensions (discoveries in the vicinity of an existing reservoir, and often part of
the same pool), and revisions (changes in the estimates of existing reserves that
often result from new information that becomes available after production begins).
Although new discoveries and extensions can be seen to have a strong dependence on well
drilling and cumulative reserve additions, revisions usually show no such depen-
dence, but indeed behave like a random process with a mean value several times
(6.0 in the Permian region) larger than the mean value of discoveries plus exten-
17
sions. Since we wish to account for reserve additions, and not simply discoveries
and extensions, we multiply our data on discoveries plus extensions by the ratio of
the mean value of reserve additions to the mean value of discoveries plus extensions.
It is this constructed series that we use as "discoveries" in our model, and to
which we fit equation (29):
log DISC = 2.389 + 0.599 logw - .0002258x (30)
(0.77) (1.53) (-5.86)
R = .837 S.E. = 0.172 F(2/7) = 17.93
Here both DISC and x are measured in millions of barrels.
Finally, we need a market demand function to complete our specification.
We use a linear demand function with a price elasticity of -0.1 at a price of $3.00
and production of 600 million barrels (roughly the average price and production
level during the 1965-1974 period):18
q = 660 - 20p (31)
1 7Which is why a major limitation of this paper is its failure to deal with uncer-
tainty.
The reflects oil demand elasticity estimates for the 1960's, a period during which
real oil prices were roughly constant at about $3. Elasticity estimates for today's
higher prices are in the range of -0.2 to -0.5; equation (31) implies an elas-
ticity of -0.45 at a price of $10. Equation (31) is also consistent with a "back-
stop" price of $33; at this price demand becomes zero as oil is replaced with
alternative energy sources.
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To obtain numerical solutions for this example, we write difference equation
approximations to our differential equations for w and p, and substitute in our
estimated functions. In the competitive case:
450 9.81x10 .6 -.000226x (32)
Pt 1.05Pt-1 R R2t-l t-l
6 qt-1 .6 -.000226x (33)
=t 1.125w -2.196x10 wt~le t-l
tlt-l
To these equations we add the identities
t xtl + 10.9w e- t (34000226xt )
t Rt-l tqt 4 Xt-l (35)
To obtain an optimal solution, we repeatedly simulate this model, varying the
initial conditions for po and w until the terminal condition that w, q, and average
profit all become zero simultaneously is satisfied. (To obtain a solution to the
monopoly case, we replace t in equation (32) with marginal revenue, and then obtain
an expression for marginal revenue from equation (31)).
Solutions for the competitive case are given in Table 1, and for the monopoly
case in Table 2. These solutions are also shown graphically in Figures 6, 7, and 8.
Note that as expected, the competitive price is initially lower, but later
higher, than the monopoly price. Since production is initially lower in the monopoly
case, less discoveries are needed to maintain the reserve base, so that exploratory
effort is smaller. In the competitive case exploration and production cease after
about 55 years, but since average production over this period is smaller in the
monopoly case, monopoly exploration and production continues for an additional 37
years - although at the points of termination, cumulative discoveries are about
the same for the two cases.
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Table 1: Solutions to Competitive Case
Production
(106 barrels/
year)
552.0
557.0
554.9
551.9
548.5
544.7
540.7
536.4
531.9
527.1
522.1
516.9
511.4
505.7
499.8
493.6
458.8
417.0
368.1
312.4
251.0
185.4
113.6
22.04
0.180
Price
($/barrel)
5.400
5.146
5.254
5.402
5.573
5.760
5.-962
6.176
6.403
6.641
6.891
7.152
7.425
7.711
8.008
8.317
10.05
12.14
14.59
17.37
20.44
23.72
27.31
31.89
32.99
Rent
($/barrel)
4.150
4.177
4.284
4.488
4.661
4.842
5.033
5.232
5.441
5.658
5.883
6.117
6.361
6.614
6.876
7.147
7.99
10.39
12.35
14.41
16.45
18.20
19.58
22.12
23.23
W-Explor.
Activity
9353
4779
4120
3794
3612
3511
3462
3450
3464
3500
3554
3623
3705
3798
3902
4014
4681
5411
5978
6012
5062
2968
669.8
3.074
3.415
Reserves
(106
barrels)
717.0
9243
9648
9801
9822
9763
9649
9496
9315
9112
8892
8660
8419
8170
7917
7659
4361
5117
3994
3031
2243
1623
1159
917.1
917.9
Cum. Disc.
(106 barrels)
Profits
(106 $/year)
0.0
2630
3590
4295
4865
5350
5777
6161
6511
6835
7138
7423
7693
7950
8196
8433
9500
10428
11247
11960
12552
12993
13244
13308
13309
1556
1901
2019
2118
2209
2298
2385
2471
2557
2643
2729
2815
2900
2985
3070
3154
3550
3867
4039
3996
3684
3071
2075
383.7
-99.03
_Marginal discovery cost & opportunity cos3t of additional cumulative discoveries.
- Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
-1978
1979
-1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2021
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Table 2: Solutions to Monophly
Production Price
Year (106 barrels/yr) ($/barrel)
303.0
304.8
305.2
305.1
304.9
304.5
304.1
303.6
303.0
302.4
301.8
301.1
300.3
299.6
298.8
297.9
293.1
287.1
280.0
271.5
261.4
249.5
235.7
219.8
201.7
181.5
159.1
134.8
108.0
77.60
40.05
31.29
22.05
12.33
17.85
17.75
17.73
17.74
17.75
17.77
17.79
17.81
17.84
17.87
17.90
17.94
17.98
18.01
18.05
18.10
18.34
18.64
18.99
19.42
19.92
20.52
21.21
22.00
22.91
23.92
25.04
26.25
27.59
29.11
30.99
31.43
31.89
32.38
Rent
(S$/barrel)
1.450
1.427
1.448
1.499
1.538
1.588
1.633
1.674
1.732
1.788
1.843
1.915
1.987
2.037
2.106
2.194
2.597
3.097
3.671
4.375
5.182
6.142
7.224
8.432
9.788
11.226
12.735
14.226
15.715
17.241
19.396
20.042
20.798
21. 706
W-Explor.
Activity
3618
2293
1871
1641
1495
1396
1326
1275
1239
1214
1197
1188
1184
1185
1190
1200
1295
1460
1690
1983
2338
2746
3180
3592
3901
3994
3742
3050
1960
801.6
145.7
99.19
73.65
64.55
Case
Reserves
(106 Cum. Disc.
barrels) (106 barrels)
0.0
1488
2291
2883
3360
3764
4117
4433
4720
4985
5230
5460
5677
5884
6080
6269
7170
8353
8851
9137
9310
9409
9459
9471
9454
9416
9360
9289
9206
9113
9010
8901
8276
7576
6847
6116
5403
4720
4080
3489
2955
2479
2062
1699
1386
1123
934.9
912.6
897.6
891.2
Profits
(106 $/yr.)
4681
4828
4876
4901
4916
4925
4930
4933
4934
4934
4932
4929
4925
4921
4915
4909
7120
7868
8554
9198
9813
10403
10969
11511
12022
12495
12920
13281
13563
13751
13842
13850
13858
13864
4868
4811
4736
4639
4515
4359
4165
3928
3644
3313
2937
2519
2046
1481
743.2
565.5
374.5
167.6
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
2055
2056
2057
2058
--
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Figure 6: Well Drilling, Competitive and Monopoly Cases
Both the competitive and monopoly cases could be characterized by curve C in
the phase diagram of Figure 4. The initial reserve base is too small, and there-
fore well drilling begins at a high level (so that reserves are quickly increased),
falls (to a level sufficient to maintain these reserves for some years), slowly
rises over a long period (as depletion reduces the discovery rate per well), and
then, over the last 15 or 20 years of the horizon, falls to zero (as production
decreases to zero, and proved reserves falls to the level at which extraction cost
approaches the cut-off price of $33). Note that discovery rates (the slopes of
the cumulative discovery curves in Figure 8) are high only during the first decade
or two; discovery rates are lower after this period first because of reduced ex-
ploration, and later because of depletion. Thus after reaching a maximum at the
end of 5 or 10 years, reserves steadily decline.
40.0
* 30.0
20.0
10.0
0
1965 1995 2010 2025 2040 2055 2070
Figure 7:
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Price Trajectories,
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Suppose that oil in Texas were a non-depletable.resource, i.e. that B=0 in
equation (29) so that cumulative discoveries had no effect on the discovery rate
per well drilled. In this case, exploratory activity, production, price, and re-
serves would all approach some steady-state levels. .Wecan determine these levels
for our numerical example by applying equations (22), (23), (24), and (25).19
Doing this, we find that for the competitive case, w = 913 wells per year,
q = 651.4 million barrels per year, p = $0.43 per barrel, and R = 54.1 billion
barrels. For the monopoly case, w = 288, q = 326, p - $16.70, and R 5 43.0. Note
that'the steady-state prices are always well below the corresponding optimal prices
in Tables 1 and 2, and the steady-state reserve levels are much larger than even
the highest reserve levels reached when depletion occurs. In the competitive case,
for example, no depletion means that well drilling should begin at a high level and
then decline towards the steady-state value of 913 wells per year, as reserves are in-
creased to 54 billion barrels. The discoveries resulting from this steady-state
well drilling would just be sufficient to replace the steady-state production
.of 651 million barrels per year. The steady-state price (43¢) will then be somewhat
higher than the sum of the marginal extraction cost (16.6¢) and the marginal cost
(for an additional barrel of production) of well drilling (15.9¢); the difference
between steady-state price and steady-state marginal cost represents the amortized
value (per barrel) of the additional well drilling needed initially to raise.re-
serves to the level of 54 billion barrels. The steady-state price is still lower
than it would be if depletion occured because extraction costs are lower (a larger
reserve base is maintained), marginal discovery costs do not grow over time, and
there is no opportunity cost of additional cumulative discoveries. In fact, as can
be seen in Tables 1 and 2, when depletion occurs, rent is a large component of price,
particularly in later years.
Although we cannot view the simple model used in this example as being very
representative of the real world, it is still interesting to-compare the.optimal
9In the monopoly case, equation (22) is obtained bu substituting (25) into (21)
before maximizing with respect to w.
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values of well drilling, price, reserves, and profits to historical values over the
period for which we have data. This is done in Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12. In Figures
9 and 10 we also include the optimal myopic values of price and well drilling, i.e.
the prices and amounts of well drilling that would occur if future depletion were
ignored but the reserve-production ratio were maintained at its initial level (12.0)
from period to period.2 0
We can see that optimal well drilling would have initially been much larger than
actual well drilling (so that optimal reserves are larger than actual reserves), but
would be close to actual well drilling in later years. In addition, the optimal price
is always at least $2 above the actual price. The higher price, together with slightly
lower extraction costs, results in a much greater level of profit.
It might be that oil producers were myopic over the past decade. Note that the
myopic price is just below the actual price, and the corresponding myopic pattern of
well drilling more closely follows the slow rise in the actual data. Producers
might have ignored the future gains from reduced production costs that would have re-
sulted from higher initial well drilling (as in the optimal solution), and might have
ignored the opportunity cost component of rent in determining output.
20We take the competitive "myopic" price to be the sum of marginal production cost
and average well drilling cost. We use average (with respect to output) drilling
cost rather than marginal cost because average costs decline with output in our
model. Thus this competitive price corresponds to zero profits. Average drilling
cost will depend on the amount of exploration needed to maintain the reserve-
production ratio, and this will rise over time as depletion ensues. It is easy
to show that if the reserve-production ratio is to be constant, the discoveries
needed in each period are
ast Rt-l (qt/qt-l) + qt-1 - Rt-l
so that necessary well drilling is given by
wt = Al/a e(B/)xt Rt_l(q t t_l) + qt-l - Rt 1/
Since the cost of well drilling is C2(w) = alw+a2, the average cost of exploration
is
ACexp = (a1 /qt)A-1/a e(/O)xt [Rt-l(qt/qt-1) + qt- Rt-1 ]1/ + a2 /qt 
2 1On the other hand, it is just as likely that the model used in this example simply
does not capture enough of the true market structure, costs, etc.
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7. Concluding Remarks
We have argued that many "exhaustible" resources could be better thought of
as inexhaustible but nonrenewable, and that the optimal rates of exploration and pro-
duction for these resources are interrelated and must be jointly determined. We
saw that exploratory activity has the effect of reducing the rate of increase
of price (so that rates of growth of resource rents below market interest rates
need not be indicative of monopoly power). We showed that exploratory activity
should be chosen to build the reserve base up to an optimal level, and then should
be adjusted over time so as to trade off cost savings from postponed exploration
with savings from lower extraction costs and revenue gains from greater total pro-
duction, and therefore the pattern of optimal exploratory activity depends highly
on initial reserve levels and on rates of depletion. We suggested the use of "rent"
as a scarcity measure, and showed in our simple example how this measure would
change to reflect depletion. Finally, we saw that in developing a new resource
for which depletion is not significant (but for which exploration and reserve ac-
cumulation are necessary), an optimal steady-state reserve level should be reached
that is independent of any initial reserve endowment.
Obviously our approach ignored a number of important problems, including the
effect of common access, market structures other than monopoly and perfect competition,
the effects of government controls, and the effect of uncertainty. This last fac-
tor is perhaps the most important deficiency in our approach. Any representation
of the response of discoveries to exploratory activity will be an uncertain one,
both in terms of specification and estimated parameters, and the presence of un-
certainty could significantly alter the "optimal" rates of exploration and production.
Despite these shortcomings, we have tried to tell a story that is somewhat more com-
plete than those usually told about nonrenewable resources.
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